

**SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN WITH
FOCUS ON THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE LEADER
AHMAD SHAH MASSOUD**

BY

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SUMMARY OF THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF:
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This thesis examines the effect of Massoud's *Nazm* (his method of creating law and order in a chaotic situation through team leadership), on successful guerrilla fighting against the Soviets during the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-89. The method of systematic comparative illustration is used to compare and contrast examples of Massoud's implementation of *Nazm* in the Panjshir Valley north east district of Afghanistan, Andarab, and Ishkamish, along with the implementation of *Nazm* by Ismail Khan in Herat the western Afghanistan, and the use of authoritarian discipline to enforce law and order by Hekmatyar in the north. It is found that territorial conditions, social conditions, and the leaders personality and approach are all important in the successful implementation of *Nazm*. Using *Nazm* to achieve law and order is found to have a longer-lasting effect than enforcing law and order through harsh discipline. *Nazm* has an important political and military role in that it supports the building of military strongholds, which helps the guerrilla fighters to survive and eventually achieve victory, even under difficult conditions.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan's foreign policy from 1919 until 1978 balanced the demands of her immediate neighbours, and external powers such as the United States, Germany and Great Britain. Normal relations with her northern neighbour, the Soviet Union, led to increased Soviet investment and presence in Afghanistan.

In April 1978, a small leftist group of Soviet-trained Afghan communists seized control of the government and founded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a client state of the Soviet Union. Civil war broke out in Afghanistan. They installed Nur M. Taraki as President, a Marxist who announced sweeping programs of land distribution, changed status for women and the destruction of the old Afghanistan social structures.

The fragile Taraki government was almost immediately met by increased armed resistance of the Mujahideen throughout Afghanistan. The Mujahideen were true volunteers-unpaid warriors who fought to protect their faith and community first and their nation next (Jalali and Grau, 2001: xiv). As the Mujahideen ranks grew, in 1978 religious leaders, in response to popular uprisings across Afghanistan, issued statements of *jihad* (holy war) against the communist regime. This was an appeal to the supranational identity of all Afghans – a fight to defend the faith of Islam. The combat readiness of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan plunged as government purges swept the officer corps. Soldiers, units and entire regiments deserted to the resistance and by the end of 1979, the actual strength of the Afghan Army was less than half of its authorised 90,000. Units of the army mutinied, civil war broke out, cities and villages rose in revolt and Afghanistan began to slip away

from Moscow's control and influence. Leonid Brezhnev, the aged Soviet General Secretary, saw that direct military intervention was the only way to prevent his client state from disintegrating into complete chaos. He decided to intervene.

On 27 December 1979, Moscow ordered the Soviet Red Army into Afghanistan. The Soviet Christmas Eve invasion was masterfully planned and well executed. The Soviets seized the government, but Afghanistan was in full revolt (Jalali & Grau, 2001:xvi).

Historically the collapse of the central government of Afghanistan and the destruction of its standing army have never resulted in the defeat of the nation by an invader. The people, relying on their decentralised political, economic and military capabilities, have always initiated a resistance against invaders. This was the case during two wars with Great Britain in the 19th Century. This happened again in the Soviet-Afghan War (Brigot et al, 1988:9).

The common people of Afghanistan in all provinces rose up against the godless Soviet invader. It was a spontaneous popular uprising, and immediately took over the control of all main cities and occupied government buildings, and where possible captured all the weapons. This demonstrated the beginning of the jihad by the public against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The tactics of the Mujahideen reflected this lack of central cohesion. From the vanguard of these people came the fledgling Mujahideen, prepared to lay down their lives for the sake of God and carry on the armed struggle. These ordinary people became the leaders of the common struggle

and were called “Jihad Commanders” and the guerrilla fighters under their command were called the “Mujahideen”(Davies, 2004: 123).

Their tactics were not uniform, but differed from valley to valley and tribe to tribe. The Mujahideen were true volunteers – unpaid warriors who fought to protect their faith and community first and their nation next. Afghanistan was not a guerrilla war in the manner of Mao Tse Tung or Vo Nguyen Giap. The Mujahideen were not trying to force a new ideology and government on a land. Rather, they fought to defend their *Qawm* (Tribal clans) and their religion against a hostile ideology, an atheistic value system, an oppressive central government and a foreign invader. It was a spontaneous defence of community values and a traditional way of life by individual groups initially unconnected to national or international political organisations (Kakar, 1995:78).

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, few experts believed that the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had a chance of withstanding the modern, mechanised, and technologically advanced Soviet Red Army. Most such as Jalali and Grau (1995: ix) stated that resistance was futile and that the Soviet Union had deliberately expanded their empire to the south.

The Soviet Union had come to stay. Although some historians (Ghubar, 1980 and Farhang, 1987) looked at the British experience fighting against the Afghan mountain tribesmen in the Anglo-Afghan war, most experts discounted any parallels since the Soviet Union possessed an unprecedented advantage in firepower, technology and military might. Although Arab leaders and the West supplied arms and material to the Mujahideen, they did so with the hope of creating a permanent, bleeding ulcer on the

Soviet flank, not of defeating the Soviet Union. They did not predict that the Soviet Union would voluntarily withdraw from Afghanistan as it eventually did in 1989 (Brigot et al, 1988: 29)

The Mujahideen were all mainly local residents who took arms and banded together into large, rather unwieldy, forces to seize the local district capitols and loot their arms rooms. The guerrilla commanders were usually influential villagers who already had a leadership role in the local area. Few had any professional military experience. Rebellion was widespread, but uncoordinated since the resistance was formed along tribal and ethnic lines (Mansur, 1991)

Massoud began formulating his own ambitious strategy and ideology, which was quite distinctive even from his own party Jamiat Islami, based in Pakistan, but he did not make this public at the time. His future and his fame came from these early days in 1979. As a strategic commander, he managed to change the nature of guerrilla warfare from the uncoordinated local form to a well-trained and coordinated structure along a military and administrative system, in which law and order replaced the individual role of local commanders in his hometown Panjshir Valley (Davies, 2004:103)

He knew that terrain, as any infantryman knows, is the ultimate shaper of the battlefield. Afghanistan's terrain is varied and challenging. It is dominated by towering mountains and forbidding desert. It has tangled "green zones" – irrigated areas thick with trees, vines, crops, irrigation ditches and tangled vegetation. It has flat plains full of wheat and swampy terraces, which grow delicious long-grained rice.

It is not ideal terrain for a mechanised force dependant on firepower; secure lines of communication and high technology. It is a terrain where the mountain warrior, using ambush sites inherited from his ancestors, can inflict “death from a thousand cuts”. The terrain dictates different tactics, force structure and equipment from those of conventional war (Bain, 1982: 73).

On the basis of taking advantage of the ragged terrain, Massoud made his military strategic plan of a long-protracted war of attrition against the Soviet Union Red Army. The Red Army’s consecutive massive offensive on his stronghold changed the nature of his Mujahideen resistance. The Soviet forces faced humiliating defeat in Massoud’s hometown region of the Panjshir Valley. His mobile group of Mujahideen also targeted the Soviet lines of communication – the crucial road network over which the Soviet supplies had to travel.

He drew up a broad strategic plan and established a model for law and order in the Panjshir Valley. In response to widespread anarchy, he expanded his system of Nazm to other areas. He united the ethnic groups across the country and brought together the warring factions and disarmed the warlords. To control and run the new bases, he established a large organisation called the Supervisory Council. This relied on a heavy involvement of the local people, but still under the leadership of Massoud (Registani, 2003:36).

This study looks at Massoud’s role in the national resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and in particular, analyses Massoud’s system of Nazm. To accomplish this, we will use a case-oriented approach using different cases of the

application of Nazm, as well as a contrasting situation where Nazm was not applied. These cases will then be directly compared and the relation of the application of Nazm to the success of guerrilla warfare will be determined.

The role of Massoud's initiative towards the organisation of the unruly Mujahideen of other provinces and bringing coordination and solidarity among them, organising them as a "special force", and the military importance of this act will also be analysed.

The rationale for selecting such a topic of research stems from how he managed to unite the various Afghan ethnic groups in resisting against the Soviet occupation through his system of Nazm. Our hypothesis is that this system of Nazm was against anarchy and "warlordism", and was the main factor in inspiring the people to unite against the Soviet occupation and resist defection to the Soviets. Our hypothesis therefore is that Nazm was one of the main factors in the Soviet Red Army's defeat.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Since September 11, 2001, and following the American war to topple the Taliban regime in the War on Terror against Al-Qaeda, there has been a significant increase in research on the life of Ahmad Shah Massoud. This area of study in particular has seen a rise in the popularity of Massoud, both within Afghanistan and internationally, due to the critical role he played during the Soviet-Afghan War, and as the national resistance leader against the Al-Qaeda backed Taliban regime. There has not been any academic research carried out in this field in Australia, although a number of books have recently been written about Massoud's life (Anderson, 2002)

Sandy Gall was the first Western journalist to go to Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war. He was a British journalist (1982-1989), and eventually made three trips to Afghanistan to report on what he rightly believed was a forgotten war. This was an account of his journey, an arduous trek across the Hindu Kush to meet the guerrilla leader Ahmad Shah Massoud less than a hundred miles from the Soviet border.

According to Gall (1989:158), Massoud's military experience started in 1973, when he was nineteen. Daud, a cousin of the King and former prime minister, seized power, banished the monarchy and set Afghanistan on a course that was to bring it much closer to the Soviet Union. In 1975, a group of anti-communist insurgents (including Massoud, then twenty-one) staged a coup against Daud, which succeeded only in the Panjshir valley but failed nationally. Massoud fled to Pakistan where he spent the next three years studying guerrilla warfare.

Early in 1978, the Daud government was overthrown by a small communist group, and Taraki was announced as President. As opposition to the new communist regime became nation-wide, Massoud slipped back into Kabul and went underground. He was there when the Russians invaded Afghanistan in December and immediately set off back to the Panjshir valley to organise the resistance. In 1979 he started fighting against the Russians with only a handful of Mujahideen. Through sheer determination and personality, in the short space of three years and despite constant Russian attacks, he built up a coherent guerrilla army of fifteen hundred men. The Russians launched their first offensive against the Panjshir Valley in 1980, three more in 1981, and the fifth, a very heavy attack, in May 1982. All these attacks failed and caused Massoud to become a national military icon. At that time, commanders and the chiefs of the different tribes came from all over Afghanistan to ask Massoud to give them a commander to lead and train their men. He trained them in guerrilla tactics, and how they could apply it to fight the Russians (Sandy Gall video tape, 1983).

Gall's (1983:139) study is based on extensive interviews with Massoud and his politico-military personnel. In his first interview with Massoud in his stronghold in the Panjshir Valley, he inquired into the political situation. "The Afghan resistance is split up into seven parties, so how can it possibly succeed?"

Massoud replied, "No doubt having seven parties is delaying the Afghan revolution, but it cannot prevent its ultimate success even if there are seven parties. Eventually, God willing, the Afghan revolution will succeed. Although it might be delayed for a while, efforts are being made to achieve unity in Peshawar, but more importantly efforts are being made inside the country, to bring about unity among all the Mujahideen of Afghanistan." Massoud's point was that even if unity was not achieved

among the political parties based in Pakistan, it would be enough to achieve unity among the Mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan.

Gall also wrote (1983:140): “He wants the Mujahideen to be united and fight enemy forces from a united front under a single command.” Massoud’s military skills had brought him allies and many friends from all over the country. He began formulating his own ambitious strategy and ideology, which was quite distinctive even from the various Islamic Jihadi Parties based in Pakistan.

The study attempts to link the role of Massoud as a unifying resistance guerrilla leader with his politico-military strategic activities. According to Gall (1983:140) “It struck me that Massoud might be a guerrilla leader by force of circumstances, but essentially he was a politician. I was sure he agreed with Clausewitz that war was an extension of politics. I started off by asking Massoud about the application of his theoretical model to his politico-military conflicts. He revealed a brief outline of his strategic action plan that by the end of this year (1982) he will move to the northern provinces for establishing new bases like his model strategic stronghold Panjshir valley, and open new fronts in other provinces against the Soviet Union’s Red Army. His strategic plan was to fight the Soviet Red Army at a nationwide level in the long process of guerrilla warfare.”

Gall (1983:155) outlined Massoud’s military organisation, how his guerrilla movement was based around twenty *qarargahs* (garrisons) in the Panjshir. Each *qarargah* had a group of about thirty Mujahideen for self-defence, rather like a Home Guard, and another mobile group of thirty – a strike force that could operate anywhere

inside or outside the Panjshir. In turn each *qarargah* was divided into political, military, economic, law and health sections, and each had a council of ten elected villagers to advise the Commander. The valley itself, he explained, was highly organised, with himself as the overall military and political leader. Dr. Abdul Hai was his second-in-command and below them were a number of departments, which functioned like embryonic ministries. Whereas in other areas of Afghanistan the commanders of jihad were functioning in total anarchy, and

Furthermore, Gall (1983:152) said: “We arrived in the village to find our old friend one of Massoud’s Lieutenants from the north, from Kunduz working along side with Massoud in the Panjshir. I had a long talk about Massoud and the resistance. In reply to my question, he said that he saw no reason why Massoud should not become a national leader, claiming it made no difference he was a Tajik, a member of a minority group and not a Pashtun. I doubted if he was right but the important thing, it seemed to me, was that they were clearly thinking in these terms. People from all over Afghanistan made the journey to the Panjshir to seek Massoud’s help, he said.” As will be shown, Massoud was in fact posthumously declared to be a “National Hero” by the elected Karzai Government of Afghanistan, contrary to Gall’s skepticism.

Gall (1989:129) maintains “Massoud’s prediction in expanding his organisation across Afghanistan amazed me. [...] Massoud began by describing what he was trying to achieve in the north. ‘You know there are four stages. First of all there was the preparatory phase, which is now over. The second phase consisted of organising the Mujahideen both in the mountains and the plains. The third phase is mobilisation. That means the general mobilisation of every one in the country. We are not yet ready

for the fourth stage, it will take time. Generally speaking, we have completed the program for basic training in the five provinces, that is Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan and Mazar. These provinces are now able to operate independently.” Gall did not realise it, since he was a journalist rather than an analyst, but these stages corresponded to the planned spread of Massoud’s Nazm.

Massoud then explained further. “He then turned, with remarkable frankness to his long-term plans. First he drew a rough sketch of the northeast. ‘ This area is very strategic, because you have one road running from Kabul north, through the Salang, to the Soviet border. Then you have another road, running from Kabul east, here to Jalalabad near the Pakistani border. ‘Dividing this whole area you have the Hindu Kush. So you have three areas: One: the area north of the Hindu Kush. Two: the area south of the Hindu Kush and bordering Pakistan. Three: Kabul the capital city.

“I have virtually completed my work in this area, north of the Hindu Kush. Shortly, I will be concentrating on the area south of the Hindu Kush. And finally, I will turn to the third area, Kabul itself. This will take time. We are not ready for that yet.” (Gall, 1989: 131).

Gall said (1989:132): “I remembered that he had told me four years earlier how he planned to move out of his hometown the Panjshir Valley, exporting his guerrilla war, as it were, to the north east; ‘carrying the war to the enemy’s base’, as he put it. Well, it seemed he was well on the way to doing that. ‘ Kabul must obviously be the ultimate target,’ I said. ‘How much of an organisation have you got there?’

“We are very strong in Kabul. We have an infrastructure there already. But we are not ready to mobilise it yet. We have a lot of work to do first.”

Gall also explained that Massoud was short on weapons and supplies. However, the ISI (Pakistan secret service) would only provide him supplies if he gave them advance warning of his plans. He refused to do this, because even the promise of more arms and supplies was not enough to trade for his independence and military initiative.

Gall further analysed the exceptional success of Massoud in the Soviet-Afghan war in comparison to the role of the other commanders across Afghanistan who could not develop them from the local level to the nation-wide level. “During my first visit to the Panjshir in 1982, we had deliberately avoided several villages on the way in because our Jamiat (Massoud Party) escort said they were Hisbe-Islami (Massoud’s strong rival party), and therefore hostile. And sometimes that hostility might lead them to help the government, as happened to Massoud commanders being betrayed by the unruly rival local commanders. In the same way there might be villages in the north, which were pro-government, or neutral, but in a month of traveling there, moving from village to village and from house to house, depending entirely on the hospitality and friendliness of the local population, we never came across a single one. Quite the reverse: popular support for the Mujahideen seemed to be total. Everywhere Massoud went, he was treated as a hero. (Gall, 1988:132).

According to Gall (1989:175) and other scholars such as Kakar(1995) the north is basically Dari-speaking (Dari is the principal lingua franca in Afghanistan), so in a sense he was on his home ground, although a long way from the Panjshir Valley. “But

his appeal, it seemed to me, was more than ethnic. He was one of those archetypal Afghan warrior-leaders, like Ahmad Shah Durrani and Abdur Rahman, who so often in Afghan history appear as a national leader and might never be, but there was certainly no one else in Afghanistan with anything like his by now almost legendary prestige.” This comparison is an important element in Gall’s study as he feels that in the Soviet-Afghan war Massoud emerged as the only legendary guerrilla leader, but nevertheless, he could not be considered as a national leader.

Gall assumes the validity of a dynamic ethnic contest model, meaning an assumption of rivalry between ethnic groups. However, he does not effectively address the cross-cultural implications of the peaceful social co-existence of all various ethnic and racial groups throughout Afghanistan, especially during times of foreign invasion, and in particular in the north where the two major ethnic groups, the Pashtun and Tajiks, are equally balanced.

Gall did not realise that during times of foreign invasion, the people of Afghanistan among different ethnic groups put aside their differences to focus on the common enemy. In these situations, they are more likely to follow the most effective leaders, no matter what their ethnicity. This was shown during the Soviet invasion. It was also proven during the time of the Taliban, when Massoud was the only national leader left standing against them. During this time, other leaders of other ethnicities who also opposed the Taliban came under Massoud’s leadership as well. After the Taliban were defeated, Massoud was given the official title of “National Hero” by the elected government of Hamid Karzai (who is himself a Pashtun) – a title which was historically only given to Pashtun leaders (Registani 2003:138). This shows that

Gall's skepticism that Massoud could be a "National Hero" of Afghanistan was in the end incorrect.

Coll's (2004:4) approach, on the other hand, focuses more specifically on the personal attributes, intellectual qualities and leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Soviet-Afghan war. His analysis depicts him as Afghanistan's most formidable military leader. He had become a charismatic popular leader, especially in north-eastern Afghanistan. There he had fought and negotiated with equal imagination during the 1980s, punishing and frustrating Soviet generals. Massoud saw politics and war as intertwined. He was an attentive student of Mao and other successful guerrilla leaders. Some wondered as time passed if he could imagine a life without guerrilla conflict. Yet through various councils and coalitions, he was also proven able to acquire power by sharing it.

Coll (2004:117) stresses that by the time Massoud repelled the sixth Soviet massive offensive, in 1982, he had made a name for himself nationwide. He was the "Lion of the Panjshir." The word Panjshir itself had become a rallying cry across Afghanistan and abroad, a symbol of hope for the anticommunist resistance. Within the narrow valley Massoud was a hero, popular enough to have his own cult of personality and exert dictatorial control. Instead, he operated his rebellion through councils that provided Panjshir elders and civilians, as well as subordinate rebel commanders, a voice in his affairs. As a result he was more constrained by local public opinion than rebel leaders who operated out of ISI-funded offices in Pakistan.

Coll (2004:5) maintains that promising to cleanse the nation of its warlords, including Massoud, a new militia movement swept from Afghanistan's south beginning in 1994. Its leaders declared that the Koran would slay the Lion of Panjshir, as Massoud was known, where other means had failed. The Taliban readily succeeded to capture more than 95% of Afghanistan but failed to defeat Massoud and be able to seize his strategic stronghold Panjshir Valley. The Panjshir front remained as a last powerful pocket of resistance until the demise of the Al-Qaeda backed Taliban regime. Massoud was the only last formidable power of resistance against the Taliban and its Islamist foreign fighters, and he emerged as the leader of the national resistance.

Coll furthermore outlined that unlike the Pakistan-based commanders and *Jihadi* Party leaders who took advantage of the Inter Service Intelligence(ISI) direct support and refugee camps, Massoud ran his guerrilla army entirely inside Afghan territory and relied on the forbearance of Afghan civilians living under repeated vicious Soviet attacks. Massoud ran local police and civil affairs committees in the Panjshir and levied taxes on emerald and lapis miners. His militias depended directly on popular support. There were many other examples of indigenous revolutionary leadership emerging across Afghanistan, but Massoud was becoming the most prominent leader of what the French scholar Oliver Roy called "the only contemporary revivalist Muslim movement to take root among peasants." Roy described Massoud's military and civil organisation in the Panjshir, and compared it to Hekmatyar's organisation in Pakistan. In Massoud's movement, "The fighting group is the civil society, with the same leadership and no professionalisation of fighters." (Roy, 2004:63-64).

According to Coll (2004:118) the Soviet Union decided to exterminate Massoud by using all its force, believing that the crushing of Massoud would lead to the crushing of all the Mujahaddin throughout Afghanistan. Soviet scorched earth tactics began to lay the land and its people to waste. Relentless Soviet bombing claimed thousands of civilian lives. By the end of 1982 more than eighty per cent of the Panjshir buildings had been damaged or destroyed. In an attempt to starve the Panjshir Valley out, the Soviets even resorted to that most infamous of Iron Curtain tactics: they built a wall. The six foot high concrete barrier at the southern mouth of the valley was intended to keep food and clothing from getting to the Panjshiris. The strategy failed, as the *mujahideen* evacuated their base before the Red Army massive offensive. Despite that the *mujahaddin* had their crops in ruin, their livestock slaughtered, and no end to the fighting in sight. It was unclear how much more hardship the Valley's population could bear.

Coll's (2004:121) analysis shows that it was Massoud who tactfully took the initiative and in the spring of 1983 he announced an unprecedented truce. Under its terms, the Soviets would stop attacking in the Panjshir if Massoud allowed the Afghan army to operate a base at the southern end of the valley. Coll maintains that for as long as Massoud had been fighting the Soviets, most Afghans outside the Panjshir valley were shocked to learn, he also had been talking with them. The conversation started as letters exchanged with Soviet commanders across the front lines. Writing from Moscow, Yuri Andropov, the former KGB chief and now Brezhnev's successor as general secretary of the Communist Party, formally endorsed the agreement for the Soviets (Grau & Gress, 2002:53)

Coll adds that many in Afghanistan and abroad saw the truce as a craven capitulation. Massoud's deal was a blow to the Mujahiddin just "as Benedict Arnold was a blow to the Americans," one American pundit declared (United Press International, May 24, 1983). Leaders of Jamaat, Massoud's own party felt particularly betrayed since Massoud had not bothered to consult them beforehand. The shock of Massoud's truce helped strengthen his rival Hekmatyar. Pakistani Intelligence for years disdainful of non-Pashtun clients in northern Afghanistan cited the deal when explaining to CIA counterparts why Massoud had to be cut off completely. "He set a policy of local cease fire," recalled General Ali, who worked in ISI's Afghan bureau throughout the 1980's. Brig. General Ali of the ISI said about Massoud, "So a man who's working against the Afghan war, why should we deal with him?" (Coll 2004:119)

The CIA officers and analysts assured themselves that at least Hekmatyar knew who the enemy was. According to a CIA official, Massoud's truce with the Soviets, on the other hand, was his first public demonstration that in addition to being a military genius, he was also willing to cut a deal with anyone at any time and in any direction if he thought it would advance his goals (Coll 2004:121). Massoud was a realist, and a pacifist too, regardless of the opposition of the CIA, ISI, or even his own party leader. The truce with the Soviet Union was in itself a strategy, and part of his Nazm. He believed a guerrilla leader could not fight all the time – if he did, he would be exhausted, defeated, or killed. So the political question was how to change the situation, to buy time to organise, to train, and so on. The truce bought him time to implement his system of Nazm and to spread it to other areas.

Massoud felt the truce would raise his stature by placing him on equal footing with a superpower. “The Russians have negotiated with a valley,” proclaimed his aide Massoud Khalili (Coll 2004:121). In addition, the truce was a challenge to the political leaders in Pakistan, because the Soviet Union negotiated directly with Massoud, not with the political leaders. This both humiliated them and was recognition of Massoud’s national stature. The deal also bought Massoud time to regroup for what he had determined would be a long, long fight ahead. He thought not only to resist the Soviets but to also compete for power in Kabul and on a national stage, as the revolutionaries he had admired from his reading had done. According to Abdullah Abdullah who was to become Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister, despite the uncertainties of the war, Massoud planned early for a guerrilla army from the Mujahideen in the north that could occupy Kabul after the Soviets left (Coll, 2004:121). Abdullah adds that Massoud used the period of cease-fire – more than a year as it turned out – to stockpile weapons and food for his critically malnourished and poorly armed troops. Panjshir farmers, who hadn’t enjoyed a peaceful growing season in several years, harvested crops unmolested. And many of his troops ranged to other parts of the country, building alliances on Massoud’s behalf with Mujahideen commanders who had never been to the Panjshir.

According to Davies (2004:195), the negotiation for the truce was a “political battle” where both sides gave the impression that they were willing to “give and take”, but in the end, the Soviets were negotiating from a weaker position. They wanted to retreat without humiliation and with honour. So, as a result, the Soviets were willing to give more and take less.

Coll's (2004:119) study points out that before the truce, a group aligned with Massoud's rival Hekmatyar was using the adjacent Andarab valley to stage attacks on Massoud and cut off his supply lines. Massoud took advantage of the truce with the Soviets to attack these rival forces and drive them out of the Andarab.

Will Davies (2004:199) attempts to look at the triangular relationship between the military structure, political structure, and social order in Massoud's strategy to see how these fit together to create an organic coherent system, which Massoud called "Nazm". This analysis investigates specifically Massoud's Nazm as a system, which replaced anarchy and warlordism. Nazm was implemented not only in the Panjshir Valley, but was also eventually established in all the northern provinces, and in the long run influenced all of Afghanistan including the capital city Kabul. This study not only examines Nazm as a solution to help unify the Mujahideen, but also the effect this has on the Afghanistan people.

Davies (2004:205) identified two periods for the realisation of Massoud's strategic plan. The first period was the establishment of Nazm inside Panjshir. Unlike other Mujahideen commanders, Massoud started his jihad while simultaneously establishing Nazm. He developed a strategic four-phase plan to carry out guerrilla warfare in the Panjshir Valley. The phases were: the starting point; the development of the guerrilla warfare strategy of 'active defense'; the strategic offensive; and the public mobilisation and the establishment of special forces. In three years during the six massive offensives of the Soviet's Red Army he managed to organise the whole of the Panjshir Valley as a stronghold based on twenty garrisons, which were linked and acted directly under his command. He was able to develop the Panjshir Valley as a

model strategic stronghold. Having proved that this would work and having been successful in a series of Red Army offensives, his next step was to export this model to other areas. To do this he had to first pacify the area, stop internecine fighting and bring discipline to the local Mujahideen. For this, Massoud developed what became known as Nazm – a system of law and order to overcome anarchy and bring rogue Mujahideen elements under his control (Davies, 2004: 135).

Davies (2004:123) maintains, Massoud realised that a national guerrilla army could not be formed only by Panjshir Mujahideen, but must be from a nation-wide base across all Afghanistan. This notion motivated him to extend the Nazm system outside the Panjshir into other provinces and cities, including the capital Kabul. The Soviet strategy at this time was to crush the Panjshir Valley and annihilate the Mujahideen and the system of Nazm. The Red Army and KGB launched the sixth attack, which was one of the longest large-scale offensives in the history of guerrilla warfare, in terms of military power and civilian reprisal killings. Massoud realised he would be killed one way or another and his Nazm would be crushed because a valley by its own cannot withstand an empire in a long protracted war of attrition. As a result, he planned to extend his control area and expand Nazm. Massoud's plan was to build other Panjshir Valley-type bases outside of the Panjshir, especially in the Hindu Kush mountainous bases where the enemy could not trace the Mujahideen.

Davies (2004: 124) adds the fact that Massoud could retake the initiative, but to realise this dream, he needed a respite from the fighting and the Soviet- imposed constant war which engaged him in his own area. After nine months of consecutive battle in which the Soviet Red Army did not make any headway, the Red Army and

the KGB took the initiative and requested a ceasefire. He needed time to fulfill his dream of new safe areas and fighting bases. He also needed to show that the Red Army was confronting the Afghan people and the Panjshir Valley Mujahideen, not, as the propaganda suggested, the imperialists, the CIA, the Americans, or even the Chinese. The Soviets blamed everyone but Massoud. This was a great humiliation for the Soviets and was major news around the world as a superpower was forced to sit down and negotiate peace with an internationally unknown Mujahideen commander. This truce gave Massoud time to work on his strategy and he went to work in the north, especially in the Panjshir's surrounding areas.

According to Davies (2004:241), on taking control of Andarab, Massoud returned the power to the common people of the area and made this the second 'Panjshir Valley'. He instigated Mujahideen law, order and discipline and organised everything along similar lines to the Panjshir. Prior to this, warlords with internal fighting, disunity and anarchy had controlled the area. Now the warlords were gone or disarmed and peace returned for the people, something they were pleased to have again.

Davies' (2004:130) study found that by the time the truce had expired, Massoud had established four bases in mountainous areas of the north. To control and run the new areas, he established a large organisation called the Supervisory Council. This relied on a heavy involvement of the local people, but they were all under the leadership of Massoud. The people were from different tribes – the Tajik, Hazara, Pashtun and Uzbek ethnicities, and even some minority groups – but the challenge was to bring them all together, stop the petty squabbling and refocus their efforts against the Soviets and the communist administration.

Davies (2004:197) uncovers a different outcome than the previous analyses. The study concentrates on the relationship between Nazm and Massoud's administration during the truce. The result of this study implied that the Supervisory Council brought peace, order, unity and social structure to the provincial administration and to local government, something which did not exist before this time.

This is the system of Nazm, which was welcomed by the Mujahideen and the common people across Afghanistan. Massoud sent his delegations to share his Nazm across Afghanistan, which was suffering from anarchy and warlordism. The spread of law and order through Nazm, in place of anarchy and warlordism, made Massoud a name as a guerrilla leader at the national level.

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

Systematic Comparative Illustration, or the Case-Oriented Approach

In order to analyse how Massoud applied his Nazm system and its consequences during the Soviet-Afghan war, and to compare it to the methods used by other commanders, we will use the methodology of systematic comparative illustration, also known as the case-oriented approach.

By using a number of different sources, a case-oriented approach can be used to investigate the behaviour of individuals, groups, organisations or events (Wimmer & Dominick, 1994:155). In this study, the case-oriented approach will be used to analyse both individuals and events. The actions of different commanders will be analysed in their methods to bring about law and order during the Soviet-Afghan war, through the application of Nazm or through a contrasting method, in different areas.

Case-oriented approaches work well when the number of case studies to be analysed are small (Ragin, 1987). If there are a large number of cases to be considered, then a case-oriented approach can become overly complex and unwieldy. In this situation, the total number of possible direct comparisons between the cases increases rapidly with the number of cases to be considered.

For example, consider just four cases to be analysed: *A*; *B*; *C*; and *D*. In this situation, there are a total of six possible comparisons that could be made: *A* with *B*; *A* with *C*; *A* with *D*; *B* with *C*; *B* with *D*; and *C* with *D*. With eight cases, this number expands to

28 direct comparisons. And with 16 cases, the number expands again to 120 direct comparisons. For N cases, the number of direct comparisons between these cases is given by the formula $N * (N-1) / 2$.

Therefore, with every increase in the number of cases, the number of direct comparisons that can be made increases exponentially and quickly becomes unwieldy. However, for a small number of cases, these direct comparisons can be valuable.

When looking at case studies of the application of Nazm, we have to decide at what level we want to consider each case study, since Nazm can be analysed at the village level, the district level, the provincial level, or at the zone level (where a zone consists of several provinces) (Davies, 2004:202). In order to keep the number of case studies manageable and to incorporate factors significant on a large scale, this study will focus on the application of Nazm at the provincial level.

A valuable feature of a case-oriented approach is that whole situations are considered (Ragin, 1987). This more holistic approach allows more complex situations to be examined within their historical and cultural contexts. Therefore, it is less likely that over-simplified situations will lead to misleading results.

Because this is not a study that could be done under any kind of controlled conditions, the situations are necessarily complex. Different methods were used to apply Nazm in different areas, depending on the situation. As a result, the case study approach is highly appropriate for this subject due to its holistic nature, so these varying degrees of differences and complexity can be considered in full during the analysis.

There are three basic steps when using a systematic comparative illustration approach to analysis. The first step is to look for the underlying similarities between different situations that all have the same final result. The second step is to show that these similarities are the primary causes in creating these results. The final step is to propose a general explanation based on these causes (Ragin, 1987).

A case-oriented approach uses both deduction and induction to arrive at an explanation. The original theoretical ideas provide the guidelines to *deduce* the relevant similarities and differences between the cases. In addition, when examining the specifics of these cases, a general explanation is *induced* based on the causes of the similarities between the cases (Ragin, 1987).

Potential Problems With The Case-Oriented Approach

There are several potential problems that can arise with a case-oriented analysis. One is that there may be very few similarities between the different cases, or that the numbers of similar cases to choose from are statistically insignificant. In this situation, the similarities are insufficient to be able to confidently determine an underlying theory (Ragin, 1987).

To give an example, Nazm was first applied in the Panjshir Valley, then in Andarab, and after that it was applied in Khust Fring. All these were Tajik and Hazara areas (Registani, 2003:42). If those were the only cases you considered, then you might conclude that Nazm could only be applied in Tajik and Hazara areas. However, the

fourth area where Nazm was applied was Ishkamish, which had a mixture of ethnic groups, dominated by Pashtun and Uzbek, but which also included Tajik and Hazara minorities (Registani, 2003:43). This shows that the proposition that Nazm could only applied to Tajik and Hazara areas is incorrect, because it is based on the observation of looking at a statistically insignificant set of cases.

Another possible problem is that the similarities may be too general to provide a sufficient explanation of the identical results of the cases (Ragin, 1987). For example, Sandy Gall argues that in their history, Afghan national leaders were always Pashtun and had to be Pashtun (Gall, 1988:203). However, this conclusion results from taking a very general similarity between past national leaders – that they were all Pashtun – which is too general to explain the results. It does not take into account these leaders' personal characteristics, which may be more important in turning these individuals into national leaders. This was shown to be the case when Massoud was declared a national resistance leader. For the first time in the history of Afghanistan a national resistance leader was not Pashtun, and Massoud, who was Tajik, was leading commanders and party leaders of other ethnic groups like Pashtun, Uzbek, and Hazara, when he was fighting against the Taliban and al-Qaeda (Registani, 2003:142).

We have chosen the cases that we selected for this study in part because of the very specific similarities between several of them, to make it easier to directly compare these different cases. This enables us to avoid the two difficulties discussed above that can occur in the case-oriented approach.

Another complication which can arise is that there may be different multiple causes that create identical results between cases (Ragin, 1987).

For example, law and order can be brought about through establishing a just and fair system by giving power to the local people – this was the system used by Massoud (Davies, 2004:134). An alternative approach was to force “law and order” on the people through authoritarian methods – this was an alternative method used by some of the other warlords (Mansur, 1992:87). Another example was employed by the communist government in Afghanistan, which also forcibly imposed “law and order” on the people through authoritarian methods (Galeotti, 1995:29). Even though superficially, the resulting law and order may appear similar, in practice enforced law and order through authoritarian methods could work for short time periods, but was less likely to last, because the people turned against it (Newell & Newell, 1981:190). In contrast, with Massoud’s system of Nazm, the people from other regions would come to him and ask him to implement Nazm in their area (Davies, 2004:200). These different causes for what are superficially similar results help to show how the case study approach can sometimes create complications in the analysis.

Another difficulty is that there may also be cases which appear similar, yet result in quite different consequences (Ragin, 1987). An example of this would be that another powerful commander in the south-west provinces of Afghanistan, Ismail Khan, also used a system of Nazm to bring law and order to the area under his command (Mansoor, 1992:144). However, some commanders in his area of control refused to join his system, and would instead surrender to the communist government. Even though his system was similar to Massoud’s, Ismail Khan had a background as an army officer and ruled in a disciplinary and authoritarian way. As a result of this

approach, he didn't attract the same personal loyalty from other rival commanders as Massoud did. Massoud also had strong moral discipline and strong communication skills, which enabled him to influence and develop a mutual understanding with rival commanders.

By selecting a sufficient range of different cases to study, we can try to reduce as much as possible the complications that these final two difficulties pose as well.

Criteria Used For Selection Of The Case Studies In This Study

For this study, we have selected four case studies as being representative of the different types of application of Nazm in the Soviet-Afghan war. As a contrasting situation, we have also selected one case study of a commander who did not apply any system of Nazm, but who instead used an authoritarian method to impose law and order.

The first case study we have selected is the application of Nazm by Massoud in the Panjshir Valley. This was the first time that Nazm was applied in the Soviet-Afghan war as a solution for anarchy, disunity, ethnic divisions, and "warlordism" (Davies, 2004:200). As the first application of Nazm, we can compare and contrast the application of Nazm in the Panjshir Valley to later applications of Nazm during the war.

The second case study we will analyse is the application of Nazm by Massoud in Andarab. This was the second application of Nazm in the Soviet-Afghan war after the Panjshir Valley (Davies, 2004:233). It has in common with the application of Nazm in

the Panjshir Valley that they were both mountainous areas, dominated by people of the Tajik ethnic group, and that Nazm was applied by Massoud. By having these two similar examples, we can easily compare and contrast any similarities and differences between these two applications of Nazm.

The third case study we will consider is the application of Nazm by Massoud in Ishkamish (Davies, 2004:114). Ishkamish differs from both the Panjshir Valley and Andarab in several ways. Ishkamish has both mountainous and plains areas – not just mountainous areas like the Panjshir Valley and Andarab. In addition, Ishkamish is not dominated by one ethnic group, but has several different ethnic groups, making it even more complicated. Like the application of Nazm in the Panjshir Valley and Andarab, Nazm was applied in Ishkamish by Massoud. Therefore, we can compare and contrast this case study with the first two, to see how Massoud applied Nazm in a different environment.

In the fourth case study, we will look at the application of Nazm in Herat by Ismail Khan (Mansur, 1992:144). Herat had both flat and mountainous areas, like Ishkamish, and also had a number of different ethnic groups. In its territory and the people, Herat can therefore be compared to Ishkamish. However, a different strategy of Nazm was applied by Ismail Khan compared to Massoud. This case study enables us to compare and contrast the application of a different style of Nazm, by a different personality, to the application of Nazm by Massoud in Ishkamish. This will help us determine which had a better approach for the application of Nazm, the weaknesses and strengths of the different tactics, and also the importance of the leader's personality in implementing Nazm.

In the fifth and last case study, we will look at the strategy of Hekmatyar to bring law and order and security through enforced authoritarian rule in the north (Coll, 2004:119). Regions under Hekmatyar's control also had many different ethnic groups, and also had a mixed terrain of mountains and plains. His authoritarian approach was very different to the methods used by both Massoud and Ismail Khan. By looking at this contrasting case study, we can see how it compares with the methods of Nazm used by Massoud and Ismail Khan, and the respective strengths and weaknesses of each method.

The Research Questions

The number of cases we shall consider are a sufficient amount to address the following research questions:

- What importance do the territorial conditions, social conditions, and the leader's personality and approach hold for the implementation of Nazm to succeed?
- How does Nazm as applied by Massoud compare to alternative methods of bringing law and order to the Mujahideen?
- What was the military significance of Nazm in establishing a stronghold by Massoud and in bringing unity to the Mujahideen?

CHAPTER IV: CASE STUDIES

Here we will consider five different case studies. The first two case studies we will consider are the first two applications of Nazm in the Soviet-Afghan war, in the Panjshir Valley and in Andarab, both by Massoud. These two applications were in very similar areas, so these two cases can be compared to each other in a straightforward way.

The third case study we will consider is the application of Nazm by Massoud to a very different type of area than the first two applications, in Ishkamish. This will enable us to compare the application of Nazm by Massoud in quite different environments.

The fourth case study is the application of Nazm by Ismail Khan, which is similar to the third case study in terms of the conditions under which Nazm was applied. The primary difference is that an alternative technical approach to Nazm was used by Ismail Khan. This case lets us compare the application of Nazm by Massoud with a different technique of Nazm applied by Ismail Khan.

The fifth and final case study is the application of an authoritarian system of rule in order to try to bring about law and order and unity, by eliminating any source of competitive authority. It is a completely different approach from the Nazm approach, and this technique was used by Hekmatyar in the north. This case study will enable us to compare and contrast the authoritarian approach to bringing law and order used by Hekmatyar with the Nazm approaches used by Massoud and Ismail Khan.

Case Study 1: Application of Nazm by Massoud in the Panjshir Valley

The Panjshir Valley is a mountainous area, and the majority of people there are Tajik. The second most common ethnic group in the Panjshir Valley are the Hazara (descendants of Genghis Khan and the Mongols), who lived in one district of the Panjshir Valley (Ghubar, 1980:12).

At first, the situation of the Panjshir Valley was like the other areas of Afghanistan. There was disunity, and different tribes and political organisations had different commanders, and the rivalry between these commanders was the cause of anarchy. The local Afghan warriors were unruly warlords, but functioning as Mujahideen commanders. They had absolute rule over the laws in their local area, like minor dictators. (Mansur 1981:56)

In this situation, Massoud used his own experiences, both successes and defeats, and his knowledge of guerrilla warfare to take the initiative. One of his main advantages was that he was a strong, brave frontline commander. He had proven himself, as someone who was a courageous fighter, and because of this he won the trust of the people. He had used a rocket launcher in battle and he had also skillfully led some successful operations, and because of this he made a name for himself as a successful strategist. During the fighting, everyone thought he was very smart, brave, and knowledgeable (Ashraqi & Sayes, 2002:31)

The people trusted and listened to him. He also managed to make good friendships with the major commanders in the Panjshir Valley, and taught them about the strategy of guerrilla warfare. He created a military council, and was himself the head of this

council, whose other members consisted of the major commanders of the Panjshir Valley. This council was the origin of Nazm, by bringing law and order through team leadership. He drew the support of the powerful commanders, and convinced them to work together as a team. By bringing new initiatives and new ideas, he proved his leadership. Even though all the other commanders were illiterate, and were all from different villages with centuries of hostility, they were all drawn to work together in his military council (Ashraqi & Sayes, 2002:43).

In the Panjshir Valley, there is a district called the Dara Valley district, which includes the Hazara and two other sub-valleys which are Tajik, from different tribes. There was a regional problem. They could not agree upon having a central administration headquarters. Each group wanted the major commander to be from their group, to lead the affairs of the whole district. As a result, every sub-valley was controlled by its own people – they did not cooperate (Ghubar 1980:11).

Massoud first decided to appoint someone from another district of the Panjshir Valley who was Tajik to be a central commander, to run the whole Dara Valley district. The problem was not solved this way, as they were still unhappy with this. A leftist/Maoist group was also active in this area, but under cover. They tried to take advantages from the divisions and differences between the three areas, and increase their disagreement and disputes with each other. Then Massoud decided to send one of his lieutenants who was a non-Panjsheri, from outside of the Panjshir Valley – a Pashtun. They all agreed upon that – because he was a total outsider, and would not favour anyone (Davies 2004:115). That solved the problem, and the central garrison was established there. Massoud expected that they might again ask that they should have some degree

of independence in running the affairs of their area. As a result, Massoud made three sub-garrisons in those three sub-valleys, and said to them, you can run your own area, but you're also part of the central garrison (Mansur 1981:144).

With this new leadership team, they then started offensive operations and they captured many government buildings and liberated many government-controlled areas. The people of those liberated areas joined Massoud, and he started to organise the freed areas. He explained to them that it was going to be a long protracted war of attrition, because their enemy was a superpower. He explained that they could not defeat a superpower until they were united, organised, with good leadership under a single command (Davies 2004:135).

The people of Afghanistan have traditionally loved and respected their heroes who fought against foreign invaders. Massoud said to the people that this was fighting for the way of God, and that everyone had a responsibility to take part. He said that they were all common people. He explained that he could not succeed in this war by himself, or with only a few commanders around him. He suggested that the people should be the "Army of God", and to satisfy their religious duty to be united in order to free the "land of God" from occupation by the Godless enemy (Davies 2004:136).

In response, many people said that they were ready - whatever Massoud commanded, they would follow. Massoud got the young volunteer fighters and started to train them in different military skills. He trained them in how to use guns, rocket launchers, land mines, and so on. After training them, he put them into small groups. He told them that instead of staying in the local people's houses, he said that they had to have a

local headquarters that also could be used as a resting house. He made a qarargah or garrison for the liberated areas, and shaped the qarargah to function as a local government. He appointed a brave, educated person as the frontline commander of the village, and assigned someone else the duty of deputy commander. He also chose an elderly person to solve the people's problems in a traditional way, and selected a judge to run the religious affairs (Registani 2003:168).

Massoud then designed a uniform for his Mujahideen. He told them that they were like officials, that they were responsible for the people's security, and because of this they should dress in a way to distinguish themselves from the ordinary local people. This meant it was clear to everyone who were the locals, and who were the officials or military personnel. What developed from this was that Nazm in the liberated areas there was law and order, and there was a local government center, the qarargah, where people's disputes and all people's affairs in general could be solved (Davies 2004:3).

How did the qarargah system spread? When the Soviets attacked an area with Nazm, the Mujahideen fought in a very orderly manner, and they were able to resist the Soviet attack. But in other areas without Nazm, the fighters left the area when they were attacked, in order to take refuge in a safe area with Nazm. The qarargah people served both the local people and the fighters from areas without Nazm. They provided them with food, shelter, and even money. It was good publicity for Massoud.

After the fighting ended, the people would come to him to say that they wanted Nazm in their area too, because their area was in anarchy with much conflict. Massoud then started to export the same system of Nazm to other villages, areas, and districts. In

three years, he was able to implement Nazm in the whole Panjshir Valley – centred around qarargahs or garrisons. After this development, the Panjshir Valley was called a military base or stronghold. A military base here means many qarargahs in coordination, which should be united in resisting against the Soviets. He encouraged competition between the different qarargah’s commanders, as to who could be the most successful in fighting Soviet attacks in their area. Those who successfully fought the Soviet attacks in their area could win prizes like silent pistols, and also gain status and public praise. This also raised the morale of the fighters of each area. (Ashraqi & Sayes, 2002: 108).

Massoud created military committees, political committees, judicial committees, administrative committees, and people’s affairs committees for each qarargah. He turned it into a system, so that the whole system worked organically under one center of command, who was Massoud. Massoud was the leader, and the people called him a “man of God”, “man of the people”, and a “man of action”. Western journalists called him “The Lion of Panjshir”, “The Young Tito”, and “The Afghan Che Guevara”.

In three years, because of the system of Nazm in the Panjshir Valley, Massoud became the major target of the Soviet Union. In those three years, six massive offensives were launched by the Red Army. Especially the sixth attack was a major large-scale offensive, and continued for nine consecutive months, from spring until the beginning of winter. The two sides suffered many casualties. Russia used massive bombardment, and a “scorched earth” policy. They destroyed all the crops, and used all the force they had available. For the Soviet Union, nine months with no progress

represented an effective defeat of their plans. In the end, they offered a ceasefire, because they had no military successes. (Farzan & Ghiasy, 2001: 172).

Massoud's approach was that they needed peace, it did not matter which way they got it – whether it was by military force, negotiation or ceasefire. His one condition was that the enemy should be humiliated, that he should have the upper hand.

“Massoud's truce with the Soviets was his first public demonstration that in addition to being a military genius, he was also willing to cut a deal with anyone at any time, and in any direction, if he thought it would advance his goals. Massoud felt the truce would raise his stature by placing him on equal footing with a superpower. ‘The Russians have negotiated with a valley.’”
(Coll 2004:121)

This negotiation signified that they recognised the Mujahideen.

“The deal also bought Massoud time to regroup for what he had determined would be a long, long fight ahead. He sought not only to resist the Soviets but to compete for power in Kabul and on a national stage, as the revolutionaries he admired from his reading had done. Despite the uncertainties of the war, he planned early for a conventional army that could occupy Kabul after the Soviets left. [...] He used the period during the ceasefire – more than year as it turned out – to stockpile weapons and food for his critically malnourished and poorly armed troops. Panjshiri farmers, who hadn't enjoyed a peaceful growing season in several years, harvested crops unmolested. And many of his

troops ranged to other parts of the country, building alliances on Massoud's behalf with Mujahideen commanders who had never been to the Panjshir.

“Massoud also capitalized on the calm to attack Hekmatyar's forces. Before the truce, a group aligned with Hekmatyar's party had been using an adjacent valley, the Andarab, to stage assaults on Massoud's flank and cut off his supply lines. With one swift commando raid, Massoud drove these fighters out of the valley and, for the time being, off his back. It was an opening action in an emerging war within the Afghan war.” (Coll 2004:121)

Case Study 2: Application of Nazm by Massoud in Andarab

The Andarab Valley is a mountainous area, and is adjacent to Panjshir Valley. The Andarab Valley people are mostly Tajik, with small number of the Hazara minority.

“During this period (the negotiation of the truce) Massoud carried out a bloodless incursion to open the supply route into the Panjshir from Andarab, which was blocked by Juma Khan, a commander of Hizb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar's party). It was no easy task. He mobilised over 3,000 Mujahideen and marched them from early in the morning until late the same day, arriving in Andarab after dark. Here there was anarchy and his supply line had been blocked for the whole nine months of the sixth attack. In one swift, co-ordinated action, Massoud captured the whole of the Andarab area, disarming the Hizb-e-Islami Mujahideen and a few commanders (of his own party) involved in the factional fighting. These commanders were lawless bandits, warlords whom the Soviets had been unable to capture or subdue in three

years. The Andarab people welcomed Massoud, as he also disarmed all the party commanders (including his own) and gave the power back to the people. This happened during the Bazarak negotiations (negotiations with the Soviets) and it gave him an upper hand in dealing with the Soviets.” (Davies 2004:195.)

Massoud took over the control of Andarab, and the first thing he did was to implement disarmament and to collect all the weapons. He made the formerly powerful warlords stay in their homes, not under arrest, and treated them with respect and dignity. This signified that these warlords were now powerless.

In every village, Massoud recruited the young educated Mujahideen, and started to train them in organised groups. These young Mujahideen were responsible for peace and security, and Massoud equipped them, armed them, and registered their weapons’ numbers, and put them on duty. Massoud introduced new people from the youth, and they were ready to accept Nazm, and work within the system (unlike the unruly warlords). (Davies, 2004: 115).

Using volunteers from several villages, he created a semi-mobile group, of very skilled, brave, and educated Mujahideen. This group was called Group Zarbati, the “pounding group”, to signify that its focus was on active defense during Soviet attacks. Then Massoud created many qarargas in different areas of Andarab to function as a local government, which the area had not seen before, since prior to this, every commander was like a minor dictator and there were no systematic rules.

Most importantly, Massoud also put together a council of influential elderly people and he consulted them about Andarab affairs. He told them that it was time that they were responsible for their own local affairs. He also created a religious committee. In this way, he empowered the people with responsibility for their own local law and order. (Davies, 2004).

There were now laws that everyone had to obey. For example, no-one could use a weapon in the bazaar, no-one had the right to fire a gun without prior permission, no-one could steal, and no one could force the local people to provide food or clothes for them. No-one was allowed to solve their affairs using the commanders – they had go through the local government. It was a pleasant surprise for the people – and also a blow to the Soviet Union because he expanded his influence. The normal system that was effective before the war was now restored. From a state of anarchy, in one month's time, Andarab was transformed into a “second Panjshir Valley” in terms of the civil administration, the resulting law and order, and its ability to resist against Soviet attack. (Davies, 2004: 238).

Case Study 3: Application of Nazm by Massoud in Ishkamish

Ishkamish has both mountainous and plains areas. All ethnic groups there – Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara, and Uzbek – are balanced equally. The area was divided between the different ethnic groups, each led by different commanders from different organisations with different leaders, who were all rivals of each other. This led to sporadic factional fighting. Even the people from an area in the control of one party, could not travel to the area of another party, due to mutual hostility. (Registani, 2003).

Due to the complexity of the situation, Massoud was cautious in this circumstance, so he used a different method to apply Nazm. Massoud's priority was to organise the areas under his own party first, who were also Tajik, of the same ethnic group that he was.

Confining his activity to the mountainous area first, Massoud made a central garrison or headquarters and he organised his own party commanders and Mujahideen in the mountainous area along the lines of Nazm. He could do this easily because he had their natural support.

He called the commanders, dignitaries, and religious leaders of his own party for a meeting. He trained them, put them in a qarargah and uniformed them, and turned them into organised Mujahideen. He made this qarargah as the central headquarters for all the areas under Nazm, including the Panjshir Valley and Andarab.

In the plains area still under the control of his own party, Massoud knew that the commanders were in a very sensitive situation. If they were pushed too strongly towards Nazm, the commanders could rebel against it and either join a rival party or surrender to the communist regime. So he persuaded them of the benefits of Nazm, and told them about the successful examples of the Panjshir Valley and Andarab. In the plains area, there was little cover from Soviet attack so the commanders were always traveling, since this was the only way they could evade attack. (Registani, 2003: 149).

For these reasons, Massoud also did not make disarmament part of the application of Nazm in the plains area. He told the commanders of his own party that they could stay in their area, and all he wanted them to do was to register their weapons, notify him of how many people there were under their command and report their weapons, and to give him their background information. He also made the powerful commanders responsible for the unruly less powerful commanders.

Massoud told the commanders that if they continued to push the people too far, to provide them with food, clothing, and a place to stay, it created too much hardship for the people and caused them to hate the commanders. Massoud said to the commanders that he would give them money for their expenses, and that in different villages they should build qarargahs so they would not create a burden by staying in people's homes. This would help the commanders to no longer be so dependent on the support of the people. With this, the commanders agreed to register to support the system of Nazm, and to enforce its rules. (Mansur, 1992).

If anyone violated the law and order, that person would be pursued by everyone who agreed to the Nazm system, and that there would be legal action. This was a good method to stop oppressive commanders from harming the people. In this way, Massoud won the hearts and minds of the people. The commanders had been like parasites on the people, but now with the system of Nazm, the people were no longer oppressed by these commanders. (Ashraqi & Sayes, 2002: 173).

Massoud explained the importance of the support of the people in guerrilla warfare, against an occupying force in a long protracted war of attrition. If the guerrilla

fighters didn't have the support of the people, they would lose. He said that the attitude that the commanders had against the people was harsh and wasn't fair.

Massoud considered the role of the commanders to be like that of a fish, and the role of the people to be like water. What this meant is that for the commanders to succeed in fighting a guerrilla war, they needed the support of the people, just as a fish can only survive when it's in water. Without the support of the general people, to succeed in guerrilla warfare would be impossible. (Davies, 2004: 134).

By applying Nazm, Massoud stopped the forced support of the people for the commanders. He said that fighting against the Soviets was a voluntary deed for God. Before, the commanders could do whatever they wanted to do. Now, everyone became responsible for their own deeds, including the commanders.

By creating and training new guerrilla groups from volunteers among the educated youth, these new fighters had the sense of accepting law and order, of being under command, and to accept discipline. Thanks to this, Massoud's fighters became organised, strong, well-disciplined and experienced.

He then tried to talk to other parties, commanders, religious dignitaries and the well-educated. He assured them he was not here to disarm them, but that he was here to control some unruly commanders of his own party, in order to help the common people because there was internal party fighting. He said to them that they had to have good relationships and coordination in fighting against the common enemy – to accept each other, be tolerant of differences, and to end hostile feelings. He pointed out that

disunity among Afghans was what the KGB wanted and spent millions of dollars trying to create. This was a form of Massoud's public diplomacy in order to win the hearts and minds of the people, and to minimise the influence of the enemy and prevent the creation of a "fifth column" among the locals by the KGB. (Gall, 1988).

This moral diplomacy of his also worked effectively with other parties as well. They realised that Massoud was quite a powerful person, and that he had the potential power to disarm them and make them abandon the area. However, he didn't do this, but instead he treated them with respect and dignity, and tried to bring them together to create a joint council, under a universal rule of law.

Massoud told commanders of other parties that his area was safe, mountainous terrain, under strong military protection due to Nazm. He told them that if the Soviets attacked them in their area, then they would need his help, and that they could even make a tactical retreat to his safe area. Before, due to hostilities, this wasn't possible. Now, Massoud offered these commanders of other parties the opportunity to even create their own garrisons in his areas to use as areas of safety if they ever needed to retreat. Through this technique, he created a "web of understanding" by bringing people of different parties together and reduced the level of confrontation.

In order to run their own area of Nazm, Massoud suggested the creation of a supervisory council for his own party commanders, so they could make collective military decisions. Other commanders of other parties could also join the supervisory council if they wanted to, while still keeping their own party affiliation.

Through the supervisory council, they planned to launch coordinated military operations against Soviet Union outposts and outposts of the communist regime. In this way, formerly scattered forces came together with unity into one big force. They easily were able to capture a lot of barracks, military posts, and other outposts of the enemy. Massoud received a lot of popular support for his plans from the people. In response, the Soviets started to bomb the area, and distributed pamphlets. These pamphlets warned the people that Massoud was an outsider of their area, and if you don't oppose him you'd be responsible for your area's destruction. This scare tactic didn't work to diminish Massoud's support, because the people liked and supported Massoud, and wanted his support to free them from anarchy. (Ashraqi & Sayes, 2002: 165).

Whatever weapons Massoud captured from the enemy in an area, he gave to the local people of that area – he didn't take those captured weapons back to his own areas. Although he planned the military operations, he gave the honor of leading them to local area commanders who gained glory and respect from doing so. Safety, security, and peace was restored in the area thanks to his moral diplomacy. His support among the local people was to the degree that he even felt like he was at home in his own area.

The north area, especially the area of the plains, was heavily populated. Massoud wanted to make a special force, and to do so he needed a large number of volunteers. He now controlled eight provinces, and he created his special force from volunteers from all these areas, of all different ethnicities – Tajik, Pashtun, Uzbek, and Hazara. He brought these people together under a single command. With this special force he

was able to clean up the communist regime in his region. This was a huge victory in the north, and turned Massoud into a successful guerrilla leader. This organisation would not have been possible without his system of Nazm. It was through Nazm that Massoud became a well known and admired, legendary guerrilla commander throughout the north. (Ashraqi & Sayes, 2002: 172).

Case Study 4: Application of Nazm by Ismail Khan in Herat

In terms of guerrilla warfare terminology, Herat was second degree land. First degree land would be mountainous terrain which affords a lot of safe areas. However, Herat consists largely of forests and plains – which is not as good for guerrilla warfare. There is also a mountainous part of Herat too, but Ismail Khan did not fortify it, which was a weakness. For him, the problems were clashes between ethnicities, which were equally balanced. He could not manage to create a social bond between the different ethnicities. Also, Herat was very close to Iran, and the Pashtun was directly supported by Pakistan, and the Hazara (Shiah) were supported by Iran, which meant that Ismail Khan was in a vulnerable situation. But, he was the other highly reputable commander in the jihad in Afghanistan, after Massoud. (Ghubar, 1980).

Ismail Khan was Tajik, and had a background as a military officer. He started a rebellion against the communist regime in his home city of Herat. The communist regime launched reprisal operation, which Ismail Khan and the general populace under his command resisted. As a result, 24,000 people were killed. Involving the general populace that way went against the usual principles of guerrilla warfare. A guerrilla war is a long protracted war of attrition, so one of the main responsibilities of the commander is to keep down the level of losses of his fighters. (Azimi, 1999: 159).

After this defeat, Ismail Khan and his fighters left the city. They regrouped in the remote areas, and Ismail Khan started organizing them and preparing them for guerrilla warfare. However, he still organised his fighters according to conventional military tactics and strategy – which does not work so well for guerrilla warfare.

Ismail Khan's anti-communist fighting strengthened with the Soviet invasion. This changed the situation dramatically, and caused many people to join him in masse. He organised to place many of these people as local commanders of different areas, organizing the Mujahideen into an army-style hierarchy. Within a short matter of time, he liberated 80% of the rural areas in Herat.

Ismail Khan also tried to force parties of other ethnic groups – Uzbek, Pashtun, and Hazara – to be under his command, and they refused. After that, he tried to subjugate them by force, which resulted in internal fighting. Instead of cooperation, there was confrontation.

However, he was supported by party leaders in Pakistan, who gave him the duty of distributing weapons, ammunition, supplies, and all other necessities for the area under his control. As a result, he had some degree of success due to party support from Pakistan and that he had some who followed his instructions. However, due to his use of force, he created a situation similar to some other commanders, where some people surrendered to the communist regime and became part of their militia, and proceeded to fight against Ismail Khan. The result was Afghan fighting against Afghan. (Registani, 2003).

After he got rid of his opponents, then the rest of the people came under his command, and he started to treat the people softly and with affection. As a result he was able to create a large army. He also started a committee of religious leaders, a committee of learned and educated people, a committee of judges, and a committee of the general people. He created a big advisory council, which helped to mitigate the fact that many of the people weren't happy with him due to his use of force to assert his command.

Ismail Khan again managed to bring peace and security to some areas, and he became well-known, like Massoud. He ran many provinces in the south-west of Afghanistan. His area was peaceful with security. He did good reconstruction and he created jobs for the people.

However, during the Taliban's time, he was easily defeated and fled to Iran. He was able to be defeated because his organisation wasn't like a people's army, instead he relied on a certain groups of people, such as military soldiers, rather than on the general public. He acted like a military officer, and he didn't always have grassroots support, so he eventually fled to Iran. After a few months, with the support of Massoud, he was again equipped and started his fighting against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. He was captured, and spent 3½ years in a Taliban jail, from which he dramatically escaped. After he escaped, he again went to Massoud, and Massoud again equipped him, and provided him with weapons and other supplies. (Omarzada, 2000: 4).

Ismail Khan was well-known, but he didn't have charisma like Massoud did. He completely relied on the conventional tactics and strategy he learned from his military experience. The drawback of this was that his tactics were clearly known by his enemy, while with Massoud, the enemy didn't know what tactics he used. Massoud used classical guerrilla warfare tactics and also innovated his own tactics, and his tactics changed from time to time to keep the enemy off-guard. Ismail Khan used a lot of people for each battle in accordance with conventional military tactics, and the losses were large. In contrast, Massoud used a small number of people during battles and kept his losses low. (Omarzada, 2000: 5).

Case Study 5: Application of a Dictatorship-style by Hekmatyar in the North

Hekmatyar's power base was in the plains areas of northern Afghanistan and in the mountainous area in southern Afghanistan. He had fighters in all corners of Afghanistan. He also had commanders from most ethnic groups – Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek – though he had no commanders from the Hazara.

He believed in strong party discipline. However, this didn't suit the nature of the people, since the people of Afghanistan are by nature a free people, and Hekmatyar tried to confine and repress them. This was a strategy that the people didn't like. (Coll, 2004: 119).

From the beginning of the jihad until the end, he was involved in infighting and factional fighting against the other parties, which diminished his power, his popularity, and he eventually became discredited. That is why he eventually joined with Al-Qaeda, and became totally isolated in Afghan society, both socially and

politically. Being in Al-Qaeda seems a natural result of his methodology, because he was not averse to terrorizing the people with violence.

During the peaceful rule of King Zahir Shah, while Hekmatyar was still a university student, he organised violent student demonstrations in which a person was killed, and as a result he was jailed. After a few years he was released and plotted a coup d'état against the communist-supported Daud regime (which had earlier toppled the monarchy). The planned coup failed, and Hekmatyar fled to Pakistan. During the Soviet occupation Hekmatyar was the most powerful jihad party leader and controlled around 70% of Afghanistan in the earlier stages, because 70% of the weapons, ammunition, and supplies of the CIA through ISI (the Pakistan Secret Service) was given to him. (Arianfar, 1998:143).

Hekmatyar's party was one of the first Mujahideen groups to start guerrilla fighting throughout Afghanistan. He tried by using violence to remove the other Mujahideen who belonged to other parties. There were seven parties in all, but compared to Hekmatyar, the other parties were weak. Hekmatyar's strategy was to become the only leader of the jihad, by eliminating the other commanders and leaders. He started a program to secretly assassinate the commanders of the other parties both inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and he also assassinated the royalist politicians in Pakistan.

Hekmatyar had the kind of character such that even people in his own party were afraid of him. Once someone joined his party as a member, they could not leave (Coll, 2004:119). He succeeded in killing all his powerful opponents in the north, except for

Massoud. And the two remained as sworn enemies until Massoud died, and Hekmatyar joined al-Qaeda. (Arianfar, 1998:144).

With time Hekmatyar became weaker and weaker, while Massoud became stronger and stronger. Finally, Massoud emerged to become a national hero, and a well known powerful guerrilla leader. In contrast, Hekmatyar eventually became a fugitive and an ally of al-Qaeda.

Hekmatyar's Mujahideen were well-disciplined, and his organisation worked very strictly. He had the most militaristic organisation in Peshawar and in the refugee camps. His commanders fought bravely, and he had very disciplined fighters – they could not defy his command. That's the reason why his was strongest party among the Afghan Mujahideen parties, because they were harshly-disciplined (Coll, 2004:119).

Hekmatyar followed a totalitarian model of integrating all powers into the party. He was in the centre of the organisation, and every commander had to follow him strictly, with no excuses or compromise. To Hekmatyar, discipline meant punishment, even demonstrated in the form of dramatic killing to scare others. That way people would realise that if the same thing was done by them, they would face the same consequences. For instance, Hekmatyar killed one of his commanders who didn't follow his order, and who didn't support Hekmatyar's other commanders who were fighting against a rival party. Hekmatyar plotted by asking one of his commanders to invite that disobedient commander to lunch, with all his Mujahideen around him (around 50 fighters). During the time they were eating, their weapons were put aside. Eating in Afghanistan is done directly with the hands. In a large room, from the

windows and door, they were attacked by surprise. They were all instantly killed. In order to give a gruesome lesson to the other commanders, he dumped the bodies in the city square, and put a note on the commander's body which said that this is the consequence of disobedience. No one was allowed to remove the dead bodies. The bodies were left there for 7 or 8 hours, during a scorching hot day. (Arianfar, 1998: 145).

In another incident, one of his well-known and important commanders fought against Massoud for many years, and tried to block Massoud's Nazm in the north. This commander was getting militarily weaker day by day, and eventually he was defeated in his area. He left the area and still continued his armed struggle against Massoud in the mountainous area. Massoud took the initiative, and tried to convince this commander to join and cooperate with him. They made a fair deal, but it was against Hekmatyar's will. The commander didn't ask permission from him. After a few months, Hekmatyar asked the commander to come to Pakistan and report to the headquarters of the party for a discussion about the recent developments in the area between him and Massoud. In Pakistan, he was assassinated. The commander was driving, and a truck came and hit him, and he was killed instantly. (Mansur, 1992:85)

Hekmatyar's style of command was a dictatorship, and the people feared him. He did not have the popular support of the people. It was a strategy of using force and imposing his will on people. Hekmatyar's Nazm was force, discipline, and punishment. He had a hierarchical structure, and all his commanders followed his commands and discipline.

Hekmatyar used guerrilla warfare tactics and strategy, he had brave fighters, and they were all under a single command. But Hekmatyar himself wasn't a guerrilla strategist or tactician, which is why he couldn't command, or march or mobilise his fighters. He wasn't a good military leader, but he had harsh discipline – all his people were kept together through fear. They could not leave him, for fear of their lives. (Coll, 2004: 114).

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION

Effect of Territorial Conditions on the Implementation of Nazm

Plains are better terrain for mechanised fighting, such as fighting by Russian tanks. However, mountainous areas are easier areas to defend for guerrilla fighters, because they neutralise the advantage that Russians have with mechanised vehicles and weaponry. They're also good for ambushing enemy troops and making traps. In addition, mountainous areas offer shelter from bombardment. Because of their relative safety, mountainous areas are the only areas where you can mobilise large numbers of fighters. (Mansur, 1992: 128).

As a guerrilla warfare strategist, Massoud put a great deal of value on the significance of mountainous terrain in his battles against occupying forces. For a multitude of reasons he considered his decision to make the Panjshir mountainous area as his base highly significant for the following reasons. (1) It diminished the casualties of his own forces. The bunkers, caves, and underground facilities that he had built made it the safest base in the guerrilla war. (2) It was a safe area for training new Mujahideen volunteers. Also, (3) his headquarters were in the safest, most mountainous area. Bases for Massoud were the last place for retreat. In very difficult times requiring retreat, bases were the last refuge you could station, regroup, reorganise, and prepare for retaking lost territories.

Using the advantage of the mountainous terrain, Massoud's plan was simply to impose high casualties on the enemy forces, while losing as few of his own fighters as possible. This was only possible in the mountainous areas since he could take

advantage of the high ground, which permitted tactics such as disrupting the enemy by blocking the road with huge rocks. He had to disrupt, stop, and ambush. If he did not have safe mountainous areas, it would have been more difficult for him to mobilise a large number of Mujahideen and to organise them into a guerrilla army or special force. Also his Mujahideen could not stay in the plains areas during the winter because of the snow, since wherever they went they would leave tracks. This meant that in the winter, the only place for them to be able to rest and be safe was in the mountainous areas. Because of his mountainous bases, Massoud managed to prevent some of the Mujahideen from leaving for Pakistan during the winter. (Arianfar, 1998: 111).

Although the operational base command may be in the mountainous areas, they also have an influence on the surrounding area, since with the aid of a mountain base you could threaten the enemy's existence in the plains or the city areas as well. That was another reason why Massoud initially endeavoured to create mountain bases.

Massoud always started his Nazm in the mountainous areas. Afterwards, he continued to implement his Nazm through the valleys, the plains and other rural areas. The final stage was to implement it in the cities. Urban fighting or city fighting was the last stage of battle in his strategic plan. He planned that after having cleared out the rural areas of the enemy, he could then besiege the cities and negotiate. This would avoid heavy urban fighting and in that way, also protect people's lives. Without the significant protection afforded by the mountainous areas it would have been a greater challenge to fulfill the rest of Massoud's vision.

Massoud's bases in the mountainous areas were a critical factor for his success. This was proven in his two decades of fighting against the Soviet Union Red Army and the Taliban and foreign fighters. Massoud was defeated and retreated from the plains areas. The last place of retreat were the mountain bases. He made a strategic retreat to lose all the cities and valleys, and finally was only holding his stronghold of the Panjshir Valley. Because of the significance of the mountainous areas, even with this retreat he was able to keep his military and political organisation intact. (Mansur, 1992: 145).

Like Massoud, Ismail Khan controlled mountainous as well as plains and city areas. However, Ismail Khan did not create mountain bases.

There are two types of fighting – mobile fighting and strategic base fighting. Whereas Massoud mainly focused on strategic base fighting, Ismail Khan was mainly focused on using mobile fighting tactics in the city areas against the enemy. This meant that it was more like a “running fight”, because when you're on the plains, you cannot stay in one place, since there are no caves to give you shelter. If you did stay in one place, you would be bombed, targeted by machine guns, and so on. The only safety you could have would be through constant movement in order to prevent casualties and possible death from bombardment and heavy artillery shelling. (Mansur, 1992: 128).

In one major battle in Herat against the Taliban, Ismail Khan lost his central command and his military headquarters were under constant threat. As a result he was forced to leave. He had lost communication with all his forces in other areas, which meant that they were all captured or killed. He could not even retreat to any mountain

bases himself because he didn't have them, so he was forced to leave Afghanistan and take refuge in Iran.

In summary, Nazm can be implemented in any terrain, but mountainous terrain can be more easily defended through guerrilla fighting. Because of that, a system of Nazm will be more easily defended in mountainous terrain than in the plains or cities. That is why Massoud always first implemented Nazm in the mountainous areas, and only later did he seek to implement Nazm in the plains areas and the cities.

Effect of Social and Political Conditions on the Implementation of Nazm

In the Panjshir Valley were people of various ethnic Tajik tribes, and in one sub-valley the people were of the Hazara ethnic group. This created complications since the different ethnicities and tribes didn't like to be led by people from a competing ethnic group from their own region. In the Panjshir Valley, Massoud solved this problem by appointing a Pashtun as a central commander for one district overseeing two Tajik areas and a Hazara area. They were able to accept this because the commander was not from one of the local regions, and he was also not a Tajik or a Hazara, so they believed that he would treat them equally and fairly.

In the Panjshir Valley, Massoud was able to establish a web of understanding. He talked with the dignitaries, that is, the influential elders, and emphasised their common interests. Since he was from the Panjshir Valley himself, Massoud knew the social psychology of his own people. He used mutual understanding to enlighten and convince the people to keep their unity. They agreed not to allow political parties

from Pakistan to distribute arms there, which would create political division among the people. This enabled him to keep the people united. (Davies, 2004).

In Andarab, almost all the people were of the Tajik ethnic group, with a very small number who were Hazara. The problem was that the people were with different political Mujahideen organisations which controlled different areas. Initially there was a rivalry between the different political parties to control bigger areas. The result was factional fighting as these organisations tried by force to bring more areas under their control. This factional fighting terrorised the people, and it resulted in killing, kidnapping, assassination, and extortion. The situation became so bad that the people from one area could not even travel to another area without endangering their lives. The various parties drew their supporters from their own tribes. (Davies, 2004: 231).

Nobody could solve the problem from within Andarab. Day by day the situation became worse, and the people disliked it. The communist regime's intelligence was able to penetrate the different organisations and was able to intensify the fighting, and even sent them secret supplies to encourage as much factional fighting as possible. Andarab was close to the Panjshir Valley, and so by creating problems in Andarab the regime was even able to create problems for Massoud. The people of Andarab treated the people of the Panjshir Valley badly and did not let them seek refuge in Andarab during the Soviet sixth attack.

When Massoud took control of Andarab, he ended the warlordism and internal fighting. He restored law and order, established a central local government, initiated reconstruction, and brought everything back to a state of normality. He used force to

do this, but it was bloodless because no one confronted him. The commanders from the opponent parties left the area. Massoud disarmed all the sides that were involved in the factional fighting, including his own party commanders. He identified new people from within Andarab with new ideas and a new approach and made them the commanders in that area.

Massoud disarmed all those who were armed, and had the weapons stored. There was a decree issued which said that no one was allowed to carry weapons in public. In this way, the general people of Andarab became totally unarmed. People then complained about being disarmed, and having their affairs controlled by Panjsheri people. In response to this, Massoud's Nazm was to train new local fighters from Andarab, arm them, and to house them in barracks or garrisons. In this way, he turned Andarab from an armed society into a civil society. There was no fear of armed people, there was law and order, and fighters were kept in discipline. The majority of the people were happy, with the exception of the former warlords, who stayed under effective house arrest. (Davies, 2004).

In Ishkamish, there were two main problems: different ethnic groups and different political parties. These differences caused enmity and hostility among the people, which made it much more difficult to implement Nazm. Also, there was an ethnic balance between the Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara.

The procedure of implementing Nazm in the mountainous region of Ishkamish proceeded normally, because the people in that area were Tajik. They invited Massoud to implement Nazm there and gave him their full support. Every attack of

the Soviet Union helped to promote Nazm, because with every fight Soviet weapons were captured. These were collected together and then distributed in a coordinated manner to newly trained Mujahideen. This distribution of weapons became an incentive to bring people to Nazm and also helped to boost morale. This also increased the number of people who volunteered to join the Mujahideen with every Soviet attack.

The first attack of the Soviets in the Nazm area enabled Massoud to create small mobile units. The next attack further promoted Massoud's organisation, and enabled him to create further groups. This also meant that Nazm wasn't something to be established according to a fixed timetable. It could take a long period of time, depending on the circumstances and the number of volunteers. (Ashraqi & Sayes, 2002: 113).

Populating the plains area of Ishkamish were all four ethnic groups – Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara, and Uzbek – in balanced numbers. They were organised into different parties – seven different parties which were based in Pakistan. The situation was chaotic and very complex. For example, if a Tajik left his political party and joined with the Pashtun political party, he would be killed by the Tajiks. Political discrimination exacerbated the ethnic differences, and helped to turn the people into hostile enemies. They would attack each other's area and forcibly disarm each other. The parties in Pakistan mainly defended their own party's interest and would arm and supply the commanders that were involved in factional fighting. Crime was rampant. (Ghubar, 1980).

To make the situation even worse, if a group was forcibly disarmed, they would sometimes defect to the communist government. Therefore, Nazm was very difficult to implement in plains areas of Ishkamish.

The more political parties and ethnic groups there were in an area, the more difficult it became to implement Nazm. Historically, the different ethnic groups always had some differences. But during the jihad, those differences developed into political hostility.

It turned out to be possible to implement Nazm in areas with different political parties and ethnic groups, but to make it succeed took a different approach. Massoud chose to use a diplomatic approach. He used diplomacy to help persuade the people of the benefits of Nazm. Massoud created friendships with the other commanders, and used them to help control the smaller unruly commanders.

Massoud's approach was to be organised and influential. When people dealt with him, they would melt into his organisation. He gave them weapons, and questioned why they should go to Pakistan for weapons anyway, it was so far away. In this way, he reduced their dependence on the Pakistan-based political organisations. Massoud's diplomatic approach was to reach a mutual understanding to help influence his opponents. (Registani, 2003: 128).

Effect of Leadership Personality and Diplomacy on the Implementation of Nazm

Massoud had a very magnetic personality. He was charismatic, versatile, had strong moral influence, and he was a very powerful speaker. When he spoke of his plans, it was compelling to the people. He had a vision and he could articulate it.

For instance, someone who made a mistake or committed a crime would shake with fear from his anticipated punishment. Massoud personally did not decide such things, but he was very strict to put the matter through to the legal channels, even if the person who was accused was his brother. Massoud would explain that he couldn't do anything, since everything had to be in accordance with their belief in the Islamic system of law. He personally made no legal decisions, but he was the one who enforced law and order through the system. Legal matters would be put to a judge. (Aman, 2002: 144).

He had a magnetic personality which made everyone feel like he was his best friend, and made people feel proud to be with him. Even in difficult times, his colleagues didn't leave him, but remained around him at all times. That's because during difficult times, Massoud was himself right on the frontline. This gave him strong moral authority.

His charismatic personality helped Massoud to establish Nazm, because he made friends with people. Even commanders came and had their photo taken with him as a matter of pride. The fact that he was also a humble person, and not arrogant, also attracted people to him as well. (Aman, 2002: 145).

Massoud, from the beginning of the jihad to the end, never lost his friends. Massoud was the only commander who had people around him, commanders down to the most junior mujahid, who never defected to the regime. No one betrayed Massoud from within his own organisation. People felt a lot of loyalty to him and love for him. Massoud trusted everyone around him in return. (Aman, 2002: 146).

Ismail Khan was a very religious, pious, and honest person, but he was also very tough and strict. His strictness made him a lot of enemies within his own party and from his own people. Ismail Khan was a strong military leader, but he didn't have Massoud's strong charisma. He also didn't trust anyone. His lack of trust even turned some of his own deputies into his enemies. That's why his Nazm was implemented through diplomacy and force. Ismail Khan was popular among 80% of the people, but 20% were against him, and that 20% opposed to him created a lot of problems. They joined the communist Government and attacked his forces.

The ordinary people loved Ismail Khan. He was passionate to serve his people, and did the most he could for them. His problems were within the political and military circles, because they wanted power. However, he didn't give them power or convince them diplomatically the way that Massoud did. Massoud gave every area independence. In contrast, Ismail Khan kept strict control. He was treated like a king and he even called himself "Amir" from the beginning of the jihad. ("Amir" means a king who rules over you.)

Ismail Khan was not an arrogant man, but he had a bit of a "regal air" about him. He put himself above the people.

In contrast, Massoud was called a man of the people. Massoud had a popular nickname – many people called him “Man of God” or “Big Boss”. These were respectful and professional nicknames, in reference to him as an important authority, while still being light-hearted and humorous too. In the north, each of Massoud’s major commanders in his own province, in imitation of Massoud, called himself “Big Boss” (“Aamer sahib”) too. (“Aamer” is a word which means “manager”, someone who gives you orders.)

Comparison of Nazm to Other Methods of Bringing Law and Order

Nazm, as applied by Massoud in places like the Panjshir Valley, Andarab, and Ishkamish, and as applied by Ismail Khan in Herat, was successful in creating law and order.

Hekmatyar also enforced law and order within his own party, and among his own Mujahideen group, both on the battlefield and in Pakistan. Hekmatyar’s method was to impose harsh discipline. Those of Hekmatyar’s commanders who didn’t obey him were killed. He brought law and order to his own group, then used them as a united force against others. If some of his commanders didn’t follow his orders to participate in factional fighting against other Mujahideen, he would cut off their supplies. If any commanders defected to other Mujahideen parties, he killed them. They had no choice but to stay within his party. (Coll, 2004).

Hekmatyar’s approach was an authoritarian approach, based on harsh discipline for those who were disobedient. It was effective, however, in bringing law and order – his areas were not known for looting or other general crimes.

Hekmatyar's law and order was an entirely different system from the application of Nazm by Massoud and Ismail Khan. The law and order of Massoud was popular – the people appreciated it, supported it, and even invited him to bring it to their area. For Ismail Khan, he also had success with a Nazm system.

Hekmatyar's system was implemented using a disciplinary approach which gave people no choices – they had to accept it or be punished. There was a set rule for them, which was any order from Hekmatyar himself, and if anyone defied or disobeyed him, then there would be dire consequences. Hekmatyar's authoritarian approach was unacceptable to the common people – it was an imposition of party law and Hekmatyar's own authority. It was the common people who were the backbone of the national resistance against the Soviet Union and the communist regime – the people considered themselves to be free. As a result, they were not in the state of mind to follow this kind of harsh military discipline and punishment. The people thought of themselves as the soldiers of God and as people who followed Islamic law, not as people who had to follow party law. In this, there was a great contrast between Massoud and Hekmatyar.

Massoud's approach was that he didn't have a political party, and he didn't ask people to join any party. Around the political parties, no one could be united in the people's cause – instead, it was the party's interests that benefited. Massoud's approach was that people could keep their parties' interests and supplies, because they were the only means to receive weapons. But everyone's common interest was to work together as a united force against the enemy. As a result of unity or solidarity, they could cause massive casualties and give a serious blow to the enemy. (Mansur, 1992).

During the Soviet occupation, the whole people of Afghanistan were against the occupying forces. Every party of Mujahideen maintained their presence and role in the fighting against the Red Army, according to the different levels of their ability. However, the strength of the system of Nazm was proven during the rule of the Taliban. The Taliban made consistent efforts to eliminate the power of the former Mujahideen, and during this time the only successful Nazm to remain was Massoud's. Massoud's system of Nazm remained standing because it was not broken down, and the people around him were united. The result was that he remained the only pocket of resistance against the Taliban. (Pahlavan, 1999: 483).

There were two time periods, which corresponded to two different situations, which illustrate the power of Massoud's Nazm system. The first period was during the occupation by the Soviet Union. At that time, every system of creating law and order had some degree of success, because of the people's support. They didn't tolerate the occupation by non-Muslim foreigners of their land, which they considered to be the land of God. They believed that the enemy of God shouldn't be there, and this was a strong incentive and motivation for the people to work together to oppose the common enemy. The second period was during the time of the Taliban's rule. During that time there were six years of fighting, with the Taliban on one side and everyone else on the other side. In a very short amount of time, the Taliban eliminated all the Mujahideen commanders, except for Massoud. Their fight against Massoud and his forces continued until the elimination of the Taliban by Massoud's forces with the USA. Even after Massoud was killed, his fighters were on the frontline as ground troops against the Taliban, with American forces bombing from the air. Together they finished off the Taliban and toppled their repressive regime. (Mansur, 1992).

In the fight against the Taliban, only Massoud's application of Nazm remained intact out of all the competing systems. Massoud then brought together the other defeated commanders from exile, including Hekmatyar, against the Taliban who were functioning as a tool in the hands of international terrorists. Massoud had the view that they had to fight against the enemy together. Since Massoud brought these commanders together, the system they used and the leadership they followed in the end was Massoud's. (Voice of Jihad, 2002: 2)

Military Significance of Nazm in Creating Strongholds

A stronghold is like a military base, but the difference is that a stronghold is usually built in mountainous, rugged terrain. It is a term related to guerrilla warfare. While a military base can be built anywhere, a stronghold is mainly built in an area where it's easy to defend your forces and defeat the enemy. Within the stronghold there are coordinated organised forces under a single, centralised command. The bottom line is that a stronghold is a place where guerrilla fighters can retreat to if they need to. Also, with a conventional military base, the military is responsible for all the fighting, but with a stronghold the common people are also responsible for fighting the enemy as well. (Davies, 2004).

In guerrilla warfare, a stronghold is the safest centre for the guerrillas. They station their forces there, live there, and have their weapons depots there. Their whole infrastructure and administration is there, secret documents are kept there, and their prisoners are imprisoned there. The stronghold also contains the guerrilla fighters' training facilities, conference or meeting rooms, and it's the place where secret talks are held. For everything you find in a basic system of government, the guerrillas will

have the equivalent of these functions in their stronghold. Radio broadcasts are also made from the stronghold. It's an area immune from bombardment, because it's an underground bunker. It could be located in deep natural caves, or alternatively be built by the guerrillas themselves, often dug into the side of the mountain. A stronghold will also have escape routes. (Mansur, 1992).

The primary strength the Soviet Union had was the use of bombardment, which they could use easily due to the close proximity of the Central Asian republics to Afghanistan. In order to help reduce the casualties and death toll of the people from Soviet attacks, Massoud also built caves for the villagers.

In Massoud's Nazm, the military infrastructure wasn't only for military purposes, but was also related to the population of the stronghold. He made a few villages close to each other as a garrison, which in itself was part of the stronghold. This garrison was the centre of leadership of the people in all respects – militarily, in administration, judicially, in education, politics, and intelligence, but the first priority was military considerations. It was the duty of the people of this garrison to defend and fight, to defeat or retreat.

In guerrilla warfare, an absolute defence is impossible in a practical sense. The plan of the occupying force is to fight with Mujahideen in a certain area, to kill them and eliminate them. Massoud was aware of the consequences of the enemy's plans. In order to prevent the scattering and routing of his fighters, he made such garrisons across the Panjshir Valley. He linked these garrisons together as a system and placed the garrisons under one central command. This system was called a stronghold. If the

people in the garrison were close to the frontline of the enemy, they would fight tactically, and instead of scattering, they would retreat to other garrisons. If a particular garrison was involved in fighting against the advanced enemy force, then the common people would retreat to the garrisons further away from the front lines. It meant that Massoud's people remained in his area, and there was safety, help, and support. If people become displaced, the other garrisons were responsible for feeding them, helping them, and providing accommodation. If someone was sick or injured, there was medicine available, and every garrison had a doctor. This was part of Massoud's Nazm – planning how to bring the people together to fight a holy war against the occupying force. (Registani, 2003).

Massoud saw himself and his fighters as a mere “valley”, and his enemy as a superpower and an empire. He predicted that one way or another, this valley would be defeated if the Soviet Union made a decisive massive operation. The valley would be defeated, or they would suffer high casualties. This would in turn cause feelings of failure, and it would be a psychological blow for a strategic long term war of attrition. Therefore what he did was to create new strongholds in different areas – in the far mountainous areas of the north and in the Hindu Kush range. This was just in case it was required to retreat to those other strongholds during strong attacks, or to ensure the safety of the people.

In addition, he knew he was the center of attention of the Soviet Union. They wanted to defeat this valley, to defeat Nazm there, and to prevent the expansion of Nazm to other areas. The KGB had intelligence influence in those other areas, in order to try to destroy the Mujahideen from within. In response to this situation, Massoud wanted to

share the severe fighting of the Soviet Red Army with other areas, and to also organise the surrounding mountain areas to make them safe, so he wouldn't be defeated from behind. He made the rear and side areas of his own stronghold to be like a highly fortified castle – these areas were very vulnerable to Soviet attack or advance. That's why Massoud started to focus on neighbouring areas, to become organised in the line of Nazm, and to create mountainous bases. (Registani, 2003).

Ismail Khan had strong control in the plains areas. Whole villages and the countryside were controlled by him, and his commanders were everywhere. They successfully fought against the Soviet Union Red Army using mobile guerrilla fighting tactics. Even the communist regime's army and the Soviet Union Red Army could not build or create posts or outposts in the area of the Mujahideen, not even in the villages on the outskirts of the city. Only the city centres were controlled by the communist regime. And during the attack of Soviet Red Army and communist army, all the commanders, even those from other parties, fought under the command of Ismail Khan. They kept their unity under his command. He suffered no defeats, from the beginning of the Soviet occupation right till the end. This success may be why he wasn't far-sighted enough to consider the following scenario: what if one day he was defeated in the plains area, where would he and his fighters make the last strong resistance against the enemy? Not considering this possibility, Ismail Khan didn't focus on building strongholds in the mountainous areas. During the attack of the Taliban and al-Qaeda foreign fighters, Ismail Khan and his fighters were defeated. He lost 3,000 Mujahideen because his forces were cut off from each other and routed – they didn't know where they should go. Their communication link was cut off, and everyone scattered in different directions, because they didn't have a central

command at a stronghold to regroup and launch surprise attacks. Many fighters escaped to Iran, and the whole area was easily captured by the Taliban. (Pahlavan, 1999).

Some of Hekmatyar's commanders were creative and good strategists in guerrilla warfare. Like Massoud, they focused on establishing garrisons and strongholds. However, different commanders under Hekmatyar had different garrisons based on their small areas and their people – there were no systematic links between these different garrisons

Hekmatyar was cautious not to let his commanders challenge his authority and leadership, as Massoud had done to his own party leadership. That would weaken the role and influence of Hekmatyar in the jihad, since he was focused on the central command of the party. To prevent this from happening, he wanted everything to be done through his own central command in Pakistan. In many cases, he tried to weaken supplies to certain commanders, since without massive supplies it was impossible to afford the expenditure and expenses of creating a garrison. In some cases he tried to kill ambitious commanders who tried to create garrisons, because he didn't want them to become too strong or independent. He wanted his own name to be known internationally, not the names of his commanders, and he feared that if they created garrisons or strongholds they would become too powerful. (Mansur, 1992).

This approach also became a cause of his failure. In the end, when he was being defeated by the Taliban, he couldn't control or link to his commanders. Everyone in

the north – all his commanders – all collaborated with Massoud, and in the south they went to neighbouring countries in exile, as he did himself.

Hekmatyar and his commanders didn't have a stronghold to retreat to, to regroup and to reorganise their forces to launch guerrilla warfare. Hekmatyar's commanders during the jihad were mainly active in the plains areas, close to the Soviet bases and city centres. They were very powerful, and they carried a massive burden of the guerrilla warfare through mobile fighting.

Military Significance of Nazm in Unifying the Mujahideen

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the top priority was strong resistance against the enemy of God, the enemy of the people of Afghanistan, so military affairs were the first priority of the people. It was the people's army fighting against the occupying forces. The people sought out brave commanders to volunteer to take part in their share of the fighting against God's enemy. The commanders with a reputation for intelligence and bravery had more people around them, because they were fighting on the frontline, and the people respected most those commanders who fought on the frontlines. The people in general didn't take seriously or support the weak commanders, or those who seemed less brave. The commanders like Massoud who initiated a successful strategic plan through defeating the Soviets in his area were strongly supported, as the people of Afghanistan now and in the past are naturally supportive towards their heroes. Without being a successful commander and defeating the enemy, and therefore gaining the respect of the people, it would not be possible to create a system of law and order and also to be able to apply it. (Davies, 2004).

Guerrilla war means small-scale war. It means that the commanders of guerrilla warfare groups are local characters, and they are scattered across the villages. To become successful and known nationwide as a major guerrilla commander, it is required to have the reputation and characteristics of a hero. It is obvious that the people like their heroes, with the myth and legend that accompany them. A hero can lead the war on a larger scale due to his followers, and can do more large scale damage to the enemy. The heroes in national resistance against occupying forces are also unifying figures, at the national or regional level.

In order to be a nationwide hero, the leader needs to have some charisma, some versatility and to be attractive to the people. Only a person who leads the fighting during the war can be a hero – not just one who stays behind the front lines and organizes and regulates the supplies.

In the jihad in Afghanistan, there were individual heroes at the local level, district level, provincial level, regional level, and national heroes at the national level. Massoud was a national hero because he was fighting for the emancipation of Afghanistan at the national level. In particular, his Nazm made him into a national resistance leader, because his Nazm united the people nationwide.

In Ishkamish, Massoud used Nazm to unify the commanders of the area. He then proceeded to unify the north zone, so they were all fighting under his command in a coordinated way.

During and after the Soviet withdrawal, Massoud organised national-level meetings of the commanders of Afghanistan. At one of these national-level meetings he was elected as the leading strategist commander to carry on the guerrilla warfare in a coordinated manner to topple the communist regime. The guerrilla commanders could then attack simultaneously in a coordinated way. (Ashraqi & Sayes, 2002: 121).

Ismail Khan only managed to unify the commanders in the southwest zone, which covers a number of provinces. Practically, it was a good idea, but in the application of this idea he had some failures. His setbacks were due to not having competent, skilled leading commanders to coordinate and train the commanders of the other areas. He had the ambition and he put it into action, but it ended as a failure. In the end, he did not train the other areas' commanders in Nazm.

Ismail Khan was considered a hero, and did attract people to fight with him in that respect, so in that way he was a unifying figure. Individually, Ismail Khan was very successful. But the lack of creating a leadership team caused him to fail to in accomplishing his unifying vision. He was a strong military leader, but not a strong political leader. (Ashraqi & Sayes, 2002: 158).

In contrast, Massoud had practical, skilled commanders who educated and trained the Mujahideen commanders of the other areas about his system of Nazm. He had a military cadre, a political cadre, and an intelligence cadre. His leadership was a team leadership, so he had teams working for him. By the beginning of the war, he knew precisely that war could not be successfully fought without having a team leadership and skilled political and military cadres. Massoud initially made a name for himself as

a hero at a national and was known internationally, then he started to create skilled professional cadres. This leadership team worked for him in different areas of Afghanistan in different capacities. Some were working as representatives, to create a web of communication and mutual understanding. In some areas he practically implemented law and order.

Hekmatyar was different again. He was always based in Pakistan, and he tried to bring law and order from outside, but he failed to do so because he was not inside Afghanistan leading. He was trying to lead from behind. In comparison to other leaders in Pakistan, he was successful, but compared to other successful commanders based on the frontlines in Afghanistan, he was a failure. Hekmatyar was not a hero, instead he was just a strict, disciplined and organised party leader.

In summary, teaching and spreading Nazm, as well as being a hero in the eyes of the people, both played a role in unifying the people to fight against the Soviets.

Massoud had a strategic plan with a national agenda, and part of that plan was that he believed that it was best to think nationally, but act locally. This meant that you should make your plans big, but start working for them on a small scale. From starting small, he developed his plan towards achieving the final aim, which was to liberate Afghanistan and free it from occupation. To this end he ceaselessly promoted his Nazm, month after month and year after year. His area of control expanded as his Nazm influenced a lot of other areas. He was working for the freedom of Afghanistan at the national level.

While Ismail Khan was an individual hero, he did not have a very precise strategic plan. That's why in practice, he managed to focus on a regional base, and in this he was very successful. However, he failed at the national level – he wasn't a national hero. When the central government was established in Afghanistan after the Taliban, he was still persistently working at the regional level, on reconstruction and rehabilitation. In this, he was a threat to the central government. He emerged as a major warlord, to control his southwest zone. This was an unacceptable threat to the central government's influence, who dismissed him.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

This study shows that territorial conditions are relevant to the implementation of Nazm during the Soviet-Afghan war because mountainous terrain is more easily defended against Soviet attacks. As a result, it is easier to create a stronghold in mountainous areas as compared with the plains areas.

It is possible to divide Nazm into three stages: the creation of Nazm; the maintenance of Nazm; and finally the consolidation of Nazm, that is, strengthening the area of Nazm against enemy attack. This study shows that terrain does not matter for the creation of Nazm, but for the maintenance and consolidation of Nazm it does matter, because mountainous terrain can be more easily defended against Soviet attack.

Social conditions are very important for Nazm. It's easier to establish Nazm if there is one ethnicity or one political party. When there was more than one ethnicity or political party, it makes the establishing of Nazm more complex, but not necessarily impossible. If one party gets weaker in confronting another party, then they may defect to the regime. The different parties caused anarchy, and politicised the ethnic differences.

During the war the people showed the spirit of loving their heroes. It's easier to establish Nazm if you're a hero, and the people love you. We can call this "military charisma". Personal charisma is also very important, because without charisma the leader won't get the same amount of loyalty. If you're not a courageous or successful commander, then your influence will remain local. Commanders also have to not only

work for their own area or their own ethnic group, but for other areas and ethnic groups too.

Both Nazm and being a hero helped to unify the people. Nazm helped to bring previously independent commanders and Mujahideen to fight together in a coordinated manner. This unification in turn strengthened the guerrilla war, since larger numbers of people would fight in a coordinated manner.

The strategy of Massoud was that peace is the final aim of every war. He argued that it's better to consider peace as an aim, and fighting as a means or an instrument. Other Mujahideen fighters had other ideas – they wanted to destroy all Soviet troops, with no compromise and no peace. Practically everyone else was belligerent – they focused on killing and defeating the enemy, instead of focusing on how to achieve peace.

This study examined two methods of bringing law and order, the method of Nazm applied by Massoud and Ismail Khan, and the method of authoritarianism applied by Hekmatyar. It was found that both methods can lead to law and order in the short term, but authoritarianism does not last as long because the people rebel against it. It was party rule, not “people rule”, whereas Nazm was more about “people rule”. This was shown by the collapse of Hekmatyar's authoritarian system after the Taliban.

The system of Nazm supports building strongholds as was practiced by Massoud, but others who implemented Nazm, like Ismail Khan, chose not to build strongholds. Therefore, a Nazm system supports strongholds, but does not require it. However, building strongholds also strengthens the maintenance and consolidation of Nazm. In

contrast, authoritarian rule works against the building of strongholds, because the leader often wants to divide the commanders under him to weaken them, so they could not challenge his authority. This gives the leader an incentive to discourage the building of strongholds, rather than to encourage it. Building strongholds helped in fighting a modern successful guerrilla war, as it meant that during a strong attack the fighters and the people could retreat and survive to fight again.

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